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The main aim of this report is to inform policymakers and the public about the conditions under 
which temporary foreign workers (TFWs) are recruited to work in agriculture in Quebec, Can-
ada and the role that recruitment intermediaries play in that process. This report presents the 
results of a field study conducted between June and November 2015 that sought to document 
recruitment practices in Guatemala of Guatemalan agricultural workers recruited to Quebec, and 
suggests steps that can be taken to improve this process. The mixed-methods approach combined 
qualitative and quantitative research including semi-directed interviews, focus groups and an 
anonymous survey. 
About the authors: Dalia Gesualdi-Fecteau, professor, Faculty of Political Science and Law of the Uni-
versity of Quebec in Montréal (UQAM); Andréanne Thibault, M.A (UQAM, 2015) and student, Bachelor of 
law, UQAM; Nan Schivone, J.D. (Lewis & Clark Law School, 1998), Legal Director, Justice In Motion; Caro-
line Dufour, Volunteer Legal Advisor, Lawyers Without Borders Canada (LWBC), LL.B (Université de Sher-
brooke, 2009), LL.M (UQAM, 2016); Sarah Gouin, B.A. (UQAM, 2015) and LL.M student (UQAM); Nina 
Monjean, B.A. (UQAM, 2015) and LL.M. (2016, Charles University, Prague); Éloïse Moses, B.A. (UQAM, 
2015) and student, Bachelor of law (UQAM). 
About the research: This research was supported by a research grant from UQAMs’ Service aux col-
lectivités (this institutional program supports collaborative research initiatives between community orga-
nizations, unions and researchers). The authors also wish to mention that this article partially stems from 
research conducted for a clinical project at UQAM’s International Clinic for the Defense of Human Rights 
in collaboration with Justice in Motion (formerly Global Workers Justice Alliance). The authors there-
fore would like to thank Cathleen Caron, Executive director of Justice with Motion, and Pr Mirja Trilsch, 
director of UQAM’s International Clinic for the Defense of Human Rights (CIDDHU) for their insightful 
comments. However, the authors are solely responsible for any errors or omissions.
The On the Move Partnership is a project of the SafetyNet Centre for Occupational Health & Safety 
Research at Memorial University of Newfoundland. On the Move is funded by the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Research & Development Corporation of Newfoundland 
and Labrador, the Canada Foundation for Innovation, and numerous university and community partners, 
www.onthemovepartnership.ca. 
3Contents
Executive Summary              4
Abbreviations:               5
Introduction               6
A Story of Debt and Broken Promises: What Do We Know About Recruitment Practices?     6
Documenting Recruitment Practices: Research Methodology          7
Who, How and How Much? Mapping the Recruitment Practices of Guatemalan Agricultural Workers     8
 A. Who? Identifying the Guatemalan Recruitment Network        9
 B. How? Contextualizing the Formalization of the Employment         9
 C. How Much? The Cost of a Canadian Journey        10
The Regulation of the Recruitment of Temporary Foreign Workers: A Normative Conundrum?    13
 A. Exploring the nature and scope of the Canadian legal framework: a fragmented landscape  13
 B. The Guatemalan regulatory framework: from formal standards to a compliance assessment   15
 C. The added value of international regulation: recruitment issues as foreseen by international law 16
Conclusion: Seeking to address the normative conundrum: what regulatory pathway?    18
4Executive Summary
In Canada, a growing number of employers hire workers through various temporary migration programs 
(TMPs). Employers from the agricultural sector can acquire workers through the Seasonal Agricultural 
Worker Program (SAWP) or the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP), or both simultaneously. 
Under the TFWP, employers are not formally restricted to hire workers from specific sending countries; 
they can recruit available workers from the jurisdiction of their choice. 
The choice of countries from which agricultural workers are recruited through the agricultural stream of 
the TFWP are a result of the strategies developed by private labour suppliers contracted by employers. 
These labour suppliers generally work in pairs, one operating in the sending country and another in Can-
ada. Indeed, few agricultural employers conduct the recruitment of temporary foreign workers (TFWs) 
themselves. Employers will generally contract with a private labour supplier in Canada, also called a “liai-
son agency.” The liaison agency will pair with private recruiters located abroad, which will carry out the 
selection and assignation of workers to specific employers.
The results of our field study, which combined qualitative and quantitative research, confirm that the 
recruitment process can be a rough ride for TFWs hired in Quebec through the agricultural stream of 
the TFWP. Many TFWs take out loans to cover various expenses and fees, some of which are charged by 
recruitment intermediaries that operate abroad on behalf of the employer. We suggest that these debts 
may explain why TFWs are generally not inclined to act on their labour rights as they are unlikely to do 
or say anything that might, in their perception, jeopardize their employment and their ability to repay 
their debts.
We argue that despite provincial legislation aimed at the regulation of TFW recruitment intermediaries in 
some provinces, the Canadian regulatory framework does not comprehensively and fully foresee unlawful 
conduct that may occur during recruitment. Further, while Canadian provincial labour legislation applies 
to TFWs in theory, it cannot address abusive recruitment practices that happen abroad. 
In addition to describing our research process and results, this report briefly reviews various internation-
al conventions and treaties that reflect concerns regarding the need for social protection of TFWs. We 
argue their ratification could generate more awareness of the particular rights at stake. 
We also make various policy and practice recommendations for monitoring and enforcement that would 
hold recruiting intermediaries, liaison agencies and employers accountable to rules regarding recruitment.
5Abbreviations:
 SAWP   Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program 
 TFWP  Temporary Foreign Worker Program
 TFW  Temporary Foreign Worker
 IOM  International Organization for Migration
 ESDC  Employment and Social Development Canada 
 MIDI  Ministry of Immigration, Diversity and Inclusion – Quebec
 IRPA  Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
 IRPR  Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations
 WRPA  Worker Recruitment and Protection Act – Manitoba 
 EABLR  Employment Agency Business Licensing Regulation – Alberta 
 EPFNA  Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act, 2009 
 MINTRAB Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare – Guatemala 
 MINEX  Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Guatemala 
 ILO  International Labour Organization 
 MEC  Migration for Employment Convention 
 PEAC  Private Employment Agencies Convention 
 ICRMW International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members   
   of Their Families 
 MWC   Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention
6In Canada, a growing number of employers hire workers 
through various temporary migration programs (TMPs). 
Employers from the agricultural sector can acquire work-
ers through the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program 
(SAWP) or the Temporary Foreign Worker Program 
(TFWP), or both simultaneously. Unlike the SAWP, which 
is an intergovernmental agreement, implementation of 
the TFWP does not require government participation 
and does not predetermine how or where the workers 
should be recruited. Therefore, under the TFWP, employ-
ers are not formally restricted to hire workers from spe-
cific sending countries; they can recruit available workers 
from the jurisdiction of their choice. 
Pairing employers and workers across borders introduces 
what Philip Martin pointed out to be “an asymmetric 
information problem.” Thus, “the most efficient job-match-
ing institution is the one with maximum information: 
one that collects and shares information on employers 
seeking workers and workers seeking jobs.”1 Such pairing 
will generally be enabled by a third-party, such as public 
employment services or for-profit private recruiters. The 
“job-finding and worker-recruitment activities” are costly 
and “the general trend in the migrant recruitment busi-
ness has been for costs to be shifted from employers to 
workers.”2
In Canada, studies have shown that the choice of coun-
tries from which agricultural workers are recruited 
through the agricultural stream of TFWP are a result 
of the strategies developed by private labour suppliers 
contracted by employers.3 These labour suppliers gener-
ally work as a pair, one operating in the sending country 
and another in Canada. Indeed, few agricultural employers 
conduct the recruitment of temporary foreign workers 
(TFWs) themselves. Employers will generally contract 
with a private labour supplier in Canada, also called a 
“liaison agency.” The liaison agency will pair with private 
recruiters located abroad, which will carry out the se-
lection and assignation of workers to specific employers. 
Thus, the recruitment of workers is ensured by private 
1  Philip L. Martin, “Merchants of Various Types: Yesterday and Today” 
in Christiane Kuptsch, ed., Merchants of Labour, Geneva, Institute for Labour 
Studies, 13 at p. 14.
2  Philip L. Martin, “Merchants of Labour: Agents of the Evolving 
Migration Infrastructure”, Discussion Paper DP1158/2005, Geneva, International 
Institute for Labour Studies, 2005 at p. 3. 
3  Giselle Valazero, “Offloading Migration Management: The Institution-
alized Authority of Non-State Agencies over the Guatemalan Temporary Agricul-
tural Workers to Canada Project” (2015) International Migration and Integration 
661.
for-profit entities that form a vertically integrated transna-
tional network. The main protagonists of the employment 
relationship – employers and workers – are integrated 
into this network almost incidentally.4 
The recruitment role assumed by FERME-Amigo Laboral, 
which operates mainly in Guatemala, shapes the make-up 
of TFWs working in Quebec hired through the TFWP as 
seasonal agricultural workers. In 2015, 4275 Guatemalans 
were hired to work in Quebec;5 they represented 45% of 
all agricultural TFWs in Quebec.6
If some have denounced the abusive recruitment practices 
that TFWs are likely to endure,7 little research, in Canada, 
has documented this reality empirically. This report will 
present the results of an empirical study conducted in 
2015 that sought to document the recruitment practices 
that occurred in Guatemala. We will begin with the ques-
tion at the heart of our research: what do we know about 
recruitment practices (I)? Next we will present the meth-
odological framework of this research (II) and will then 
underpin its results (III). Finally, we look at the normative 
conundrum regulating the recruitment of TFWs (IV).  
I. A Story of Debt and Broken Promises: What Do 
We Know About Recruitment Practices?
The use of recruitment intermediaries is now quite 
common in several contexts8 and some believe that the 
4  Dalia Gesualdi-Fecteau, “Le système d’emploi des travailleurs 
agricoles saisonniers : portrait d’un rapport salarial multipartite” (2016) 71:4 
Relations industrielles/Industrial relations 611.
5  Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Temporary Residents 
as of March 31, 2016, http://open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/67fd1fae-4950-
4018-a491-62e60cbd6974 (consulted on 5 November 2016).
6  FERME, Bilan statistique, 2015, online: FERME http://www.ferme-
quebec.ca/programme-de-travailleurs-etrangers-temporaires/#bilan (consulted 
on 5 November 2016). 
7  See Fay Faraday, Profiting from the Precarious: How recruitment 
practices exploit migrant workers, Metcalf Foundation, 2014, see online: http://
metcalffoundation.com/publications-resources/view/profiting-from-the-precar-
ious-how-recruitment-practices-exploit-migrant-workers/ (consulted on 22 No-
vember 2016) and Sarah Zell, “Contracting out accountability? Third-Party agents 
in temporary foreign worker recruitment to British Columbia” (2011), in Eugenie 
Depatie-Pelletier et Khan Rahi, “Mistreatment of temporary foreign workers in 
Canada: overcoming regulatory barriers and realities on the ground” (2011) 46 
Centre Métropolis du Québec: immigration et métropoles 27
8  See Aziz Choudry and Mostafa Henaway, “Agents of Misfortune: 
Contextualizing Migrant and Immigrant Workers’ Struggle Against Temporary 
Labour Recruitment Agencies” (2012) 45:1 Labour, Capital and Society 36 and 
Guy Davidov, “Joint Employer Status in Triangular Employment Relationships” 
(2004) 42:4 British Journal of Industrial Relations 727; Véronique De Tonnancour 
et Guylaine Vallée, «Les relations de travail tripartites et l’application des normes 
minimales du travail au Québec» (2009) 64:3 Relations industrielles 399. 
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7involvement of these entities has introduced new sources 
of vulnerability for TFWs.9 It appears that these entities 
can sometimes “collect fees from migrants for non-exis-
tent jobs, mislead migrants regarding expected earnings 
or their prospects for achieving landed immigration status, 
provid[e] contracts that are poorly translated or incon-
sistent with the one held by the employer, overcharg[e] 
for transportation, housing, translation services, or [for] 
obtaining an extension of their work permit.”10 
Some have documented that workers are sometimes 
charged extortionate fees by recruiters and must take 
out thousands of dollars in loans and sign away the deeds 
of their homes.11 Others have reported giving out half of 
their annual pay to recruiters;12 some recruitment agents 
have charged workers up to $15,000 CAN.13 It also 
appears that many workers have been promised fictional 
jobs14 while others have been falsely guaranteed access to 
permanent residency for them and their family.15
Before presenting the results that stem from our re-
search, we will describe the research methodology that 
has guided us through the data collection. We will also 
discuss different challenges that the research team faced 
while in the field.
II. Documenting Recruitment Practices: Research 
Methodology 
Our observations result from a field study conducted 
9  Fay Faraday, supra note 7.
10  Kerry Preibisch, “Migrant Workers and Changing Work-place Regimes 
in Contemporary Agricultural Production in Canada” (2011) 19 Int. Jrnl. of Soc. of 
Agr. & Food 62 at p. 74.
11  “Ottawa’s overhaul ignores abuse of migrant workers,” The Toronto 
Star (3 July 2014), see online: http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commen-
tary/2014/07/02/ottawas_overhaul_ignores_abuse_of_migrant_workers.
html (consulted on 19 November 2016); “Recruiters charging foreign workers 
in Ontario illegal fees as high as $12,000 for jobs that might not exist, report 
finds,” Financial Post (10 April 2014), see online: http://business.financialpost.
com/2014/04/10/recruiters-charging-foreign-workers-in-ontario-illegal-fees-
as-high-as-12000-for-jobs-that-might-not-exist-report-finds/ (consulted on 19 
November 2016).
12  UFCW Canada, “The Status of Migrant Farm Workers in Canada 
2010-2011” at p. 11, see online: http://www.ufcw.ca/templates/ufcwcanada/
images/awa/publications/UFCW-Status_of_MF_Workers_2010-2011_EN.pdf 
(consulted on 22 November 2016).
13  ‘’Law Leaves Migrant Workers Dangling Precariously,’’ The Tyee (9 
January 2013), see online: http://thetyee.ca/News/2013/01/09/Migrant-Work-
er-Laws/ (consulted on 19 November 2016).
14  Financial Post, supra note 11.
15  South Western Ontario, ‘’Human trafficking in Perth County’’, 2 May 
2012, see online: http://www.southwesternontario.ca/news/human-traffick-
ing-in-perth-county/ (consulted on 22 November 2016); The Tyee, supra note 
13.
between June and November 2015 which sought to 
document the recruitment of Guatemalan workers 
hired through the Agricultural Stream of the TFWP. Our 
mixed-methods approach combined qualitative and 
quantitative research. We began by conducting eight (8) 
semi-directed interviews with Guatemalan agricultur-
al workers. We first proceeded in conducting three (3) 
focus groups, which allowed us to adjust our canvas.16 We 
subsequently conducted five (5) individual semi-directed 
interviews.17 The workers who were interviewed signed 
consent forms; they were given time to read the form and 
the research team made sure to be available to answer 
the workers’ questions. All the respondents were aware 
that they could withdraw from the research at any mo-
ment. These interviews, all conducted with non-unionized 
workers, allowed us to reach a comprehensive under-
standing of the recruitment practices with which the 
respondents had engaged. 
We then sought to measure the recurrence of different 
phenomena identified in the interviews, and conducted a 
survey with a total of 87 workers: 15 respondents worked 
in unionized workplaces and 72 were non-unionized. 
This data collection was enabled by the Agricultural 
Workers Alliance and UFCW, local section 501; these 
actors operate a workers’ center in St-Rémi, Québec. The 
non-unionized workers that participated in our research 
were recruited by the research team at the Workers’ 
Center located in St-Rémi. The unionized workers that 
took part in the survey were pre-identified by the UFCW. 
The research team then contacted the workers to con-
firm their interest. Throughout the data collection, the re-
search team kept a detailed logbook of their observations. 
It is important to emphasize that the issue of recruit-
ment practices appeared to be a sensitive topic for the 
workers we interviewed and surveyed. Seiber and Stanley 
define research as “socially sensitive” when its outcome 
is susceptible to having consequences or implications on 
the participants or the social group represented by the 
research.18 The implications of dealing with a sensitive 
topic were noticed throughout the data collection, both 
while conducting the semi-directed interviews and in the 
context of the survey. 
16  We will refer to these interviews as FG-1 to FG-3.
17  We will refer to these interviews as I-1 to I-5.
18  Joan E. Sieber et Barbara Stanley, “Ethical and Professional Dimen-
sions of Socially Sensitive Research” (1988) 43:1 American Psychologist 48 at p 
48. 
8In order to meet the requirements of research ethics, 
each worker who participated in a semi-directed inter-
view was required to sign a consent form. In several cases 
the consent form itself constituted an obstacle as the 
request to disclose the workers’ identity seemed to cause 
discomfort. Some workers who had shown interest in the 
research drew back when presented with the consent 
form. When workers agreed to be interviewed, despite 
measures ensuring anonymity of respondents stated in 
the consent form,19 it was often necessary to verbally 
reassure respondents – many were wary. 
The research team also detected a certain degree of “col-
lective insincerity”20 while conducting the focus groups. 
Some workers were reluctant to give a point of view 
that diverged from the stance of their colleagues. When 
a respondent led the interview, the other workers gen-
erally simply confirmed the viewpoint expressed by their 
colleague.
Administration of the survey generated its own chal-
lenges; several workers seemed uncomfortable with the 
issues addressed in the survey. Though workers who were 
surveyed were not required to disclose their identity, 
some respondents were afraid of being recognized and 
reported to their employer or recruitment intermediary. 
In some cases, workers were not at ease with completing 
the questionnaire in the presence of other colleagues. For 
some respondents, the discomfort of answering questions 
that pertained, for example, to excessive recruitment fees, 
prompted them to leave some answers blank. To avoid a 
distortion of results, we systematically counted the num-
ber of responses left blank by isolating this category from 
the other response options.
It is also relevant to note that several workers did not 
understand the content of the survey, either because their 
Spanish level was insufficient or because they could not 
19  The consent form that was presented to the workers states the 
following: “The information you provide will be kept confidential. No informa-
tion that you may provide will be used in such a way that your identity will be 
revealed. Your anonymity will also be preserved. Your identity will be protected 
by an alpha-numeric code (eg I-1: individual worker, respondent 1) to which the 
researcher will refer in his work. The key of this code will be constituted and 
known only by the research team. No information identifying you in any way will 
be published in the articles, publications or communications that will result from 
this research or will be communicated in the exchanges between the research 
team and other researchers. The content of the interview will be transcribed 
without any reference being made to information that could lead to your identi-
fication. Respondent records and personal information will be destroyed five (5) 
years after the completion of the study. Only the depersonalized transcripts may 
be retained by the researcher after that date. These will be kept in a secure and 
locked place in the researcher’s office.”
20  Jean Carbonnier, Sociologie juridique, 3e ed, Paris, PUF, 2004 at p 
209.
read or write. In these circumstances, the research team 
assisted the workers. 
The participants surveyed were all men aged between 22 
and 50 years old; the majority (65%) were between 23 
and 36 years old. They came from various rural areas of 
Guatemala,21 but most were from Chimaltenango (36%), a 
region located about 50 kilometers from Guatemala’s cap-
ital, Guatemala City. Some of our previous research has 
indicated that recruiters favour rural areas of Guatemala 
because of the presence of a high density of experienced 
agricultural workers, and that recruitment intermediaries 
are instructed to prioritize “the most underprivileged” 
areas of Guatemala.22 
61% of respondents said their first language was Spanish 
and 32% indicated that their first language was one of 
several indigenous Mayan languages spoken in different 
parts of Guatemala.23 26% of respondents were partici-
pating in the TFW program for the first time, 13% were 
participating for the second time, 7% were in their third 
participation, 10% in their fourth, and a further 10% were 
in their fifth. 
III. Who, How and How Much? Mapping the 
Recruitment Practices of Guatemalan 
Agricultural Workers 
We sign a document that we don’t 
understand. Still, we sign and we come to 
Canada to work. Our mentality is, it’s all ok, 
because we are going to work in Canada.24
The quote above eloquently captures the way workers 
generally perceive the TFWP recruitment process. Their 
apprehension of their recruitment journey is inextri-
cably linked to their primary goal, which is to obtain a 
job through the Agricultural Stream of the TFWP. If the 
workers grant little importance to the administrative for-
malities surrounding their recruitment, their experiential 
understanding of the different steps that lead them to an 
employment opportunity sheds light on the recruitment 
21  Alta Verapaz (11%), Chichicastenango (9%), El Progreso (10%), 
Chimaltenango (36%), Jutiapa (5%), Sacatepequez (8%), San Marcos (7%), Santa 
Rosa (2%), Tacana San Marcos (1%), Tecpan (1%), Zaragoza (1%). 
22  Dalia Gesualdi-Fecteau, “The Recruitment of Guatemalan Agricul-
tural Workers by Canadian Employers: Mapping the Web of a Transnational 
Network”, (2014) 3:1 International Journal of Migration and Border Studies 291 
at p. 297.
23  These respondents either spoke Kaqchikel (18%), Chichi (1%), Quiché 
(8%) and Q’eqchi (5%) as a first language.
24  I-4, p. 5.
9process they experience. The data we collected showed 
certain patterns in the recruitment practices experienced 
by the workers. In this section we will explore: (A) who 
handles the recruitment of Guatemalan TFWs; (B) the 
formalization of their employment; and (C) the financial 
cost of an employment opportunity.
A. Who? Identifying the Guatemalan Recruitment 
Network25
In Quebec most agricultural sector employers use the 
services of a liaison agency to assist them in recruiting 
seasonal workers. The liaison agency does not directly 
select or recruit workers; these operations are done by 
a recruitment intermediary which operates abroad. In 
Quebec, one liaison agency, FERME (Fondation des Entre-
prises en Recrutement de Main-d’œuvre agricole Étran-
gère), plays a fundamental role in this process. Since 2010, 
FERME has consistently transferred employers’ requests 
to Amigo Laboral, a recruitment intermediary located in 
Guatemala.  
Although Amigo Laboral handles recruitment on behalf 
of employers, legally, no contractual relationship formally 
unites the employer to this actor, as their relations are 
established through FERME. In Guatemala, FERME only en-
gages with Amigo Laboral which, in turn, operates almost 
exclusively on behalf of FERME – they act in tandem.25
Before their arrival in Canada, the workers interact solely 
with the recruitment intermediary located abroad, Amigo 
Laboral, which assists the workers with all procedures re-
quired by the Canadian authorities. For this to be feasible, 
workers will generally allow Amigo Laboral’s agents to act 
on their behalf.
Our data reveals that in the past few years, the worker 
selection process is carried out in the offices of Amigo 
Laboral in Guatemala City. All workers – none said they 
were from the capital city – had to travel from their home 
to Guatemala City numerous times before coming to 
Canada to fulfil the administrative requirements. “Newly 
selected workers” were required to complete a variety of 
tests, including physical tests, which were administered by 
Amigo Laboral staff. 
25  FERME. Mémoire présenté dans le cadre de la Consultation générale 
sur le Livre vert pour une politique bioalimentaire, août 2011. Annex 2. It is 
important to note that before 2010, FERME had an agreement with the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration (IOM). On the role of the IOM: Ishan Ashutosh 
et Alison Mountz, “Migration Management for the Benefit of whom? Inter-
rogating the Work of the International Organization for Migration” 2011 15:1 
Citizenship Studies 21
B. How? Contextualizing the Formalization of the 
Employment 
The Agricultural Stream of the TFWP allows employers 
in this sector to recruit from abroad seasonal agricultur-
al workers who will work on the employer’s premises. 
Our previous research has revealed that, from a practi-
cal standpoint, it is the recruitment intermediaries who 
are responsible for the selection and assignation of the 
workers. These intermediaries will first create a pool of 
workers according to general criteria. Workers must pass 
a physical test (which consists of carrying a bag of corn 
weighing more than 100 pounds, an exercise that must be 
repeated 10 to 15 times) and show that they can sum-
marily read, write and do basic mathematics. Once the 
worker is selected, the recruitment intermediary will pair 
workers and employers according to the specific demands 
set by the employer. For example, some employers will 
favour young workers while others will request tall men. 
For tasks requiring good dexterity, such as berry picking, 
some employers tend to demand female workers. We 
have previously argued that these practices suggest a form 
of outsourcing discrimination, which is carried out by the 
recruitment intermediary on behalf of the employers.26 
Once the worker is selected and assigned to a specific 
employer, from a legal stand point the employer and the 
employee will become bound by an employment contract. 
Almost all of the workers (98%) in our study signed an 
employment contract while they were still in Guatemala; 
the contract is signed in the presence of an agent of the 
recruitment intermediary. 
A contract of employment is a contract by which a per-
son, the employee, “undertakes, for a limited time and for 
remuneration, to do work under the direction or control 
of another person, the employer;”27 the framework within 
which the employee executes his or her work perfor-
mance is determined by the employer. Thus an employ-
ment contract is formed by a meeting of minds between 
the employer and the employee, and the termination of 
the employment contract is the result of one or the other. 
Interestingly, Employment and Social Development 
Canada (ESDC) puts forward templates of employment 
contracts that employers should use when hiring workers 
26  Dalia Gesualdi-Fecteau, “Le système d’emploi des travailleurs 
agricoles saisonniers : portrait d’un rapport salarial multipartite” (2016) 71: 4 
Relations industrielles/Industrial relations 611.
27  Civil Code of Quebec, RLRQ 1991, c 64, art 2085 [CCQ].
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through the Agricultural Stream of the TFWP.28 Quebec’s 
Ministry of Immigration, Diversity and Inclusion (MIDI) 
has produced a specific contract template for TFWs em-
ployed by Quebec employers, which is available in French, 
English and, most importantly for our study, Spanish.29 
The employment contract, which must be signed by both 
parties, must define the working conditions of the TFW, 
and include the duration of employment. 
Most of our respondents signed their employment 
contracts in the Amigo Laboral offices (84%). However, 
some workers said they signed the contract at the airport 
before leaving Guatemala (8%). 56% of respondents said 
they never received a copy of the contract they signed. 
Only 48% of the workers signed a Spanish version of the 
document and many workers were only presented with 
an English or French version of the contract.30
The research team that assisted workers who agreed to 
complete our survey noticed that questions regarding the 
date of the signature of the contract, the place of signa-
ture, the language of the contract, the explanations of de-
tails of the contract and the possibility to obtain a copy of 
the contract were not well understood by respondents – 
several workers recalled signing a paper but did not know 
what it was. While 70% said they received some informa-
tion about the content of their contract, it was not always 
clear whether they were referring to written information 
contained in the contract itself or information they re-
ceived orally in a pre-departure information session. This 
confusion suggests that the recruitment intermediary staff 
does not adequately ensure that workers understand the 
recruitment process. Moreover, it seems that recruiters 
do not take any measures to grant greater transparency 
to this process. 
Our initial semi-directed interviews gave us an idea of 
the context in which the workers became aware of their 
employment contract. No workers that were interviewed 
received any information about the content of their con-
tract and were simply asked to sign the document. Some 
of the surveyed workers also told the research team that 
28  ESDC, Agricultural Stream: Employment Contract, see online: Em-
ployment and Social Development Canada, http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/
fi-if/index.jsp?app=prfl&frm=emp5510&lang=eng (consulted on 22 November 
2016) [Agricultural Stream Employment contract].
29  MIDI, Model Employment Contract for Low-skilled Occupations in the 
Agricultural Stream and the Stream for Lower-skilled Occupations (Temporary 
Foreign Worker Program), 2014, see online: Ministry of Immigration, Diversity, 
and Inclusion http://www.immigration-quebec.gouv.qc.ca/publications/en/form/
employment-contract-low-skilled-dyn.pdf [MIDI] (consulted on 19 November 
2016). 
30  FG-1, p.11, FG-3, p. 10, I-1, p. 6, I-3p. 8, I-4, p. 5 et I-5, p. 4.
they were not given time to read their contract.31 As 
illustrated by one worker, “They make an X and you have 
to sign and sign and sign…but you cannot read...if one 
wishes to read, they will be told, gentlemen, here is the X. 
And that’s it for the paperwork (papeleria).”32
In sum, our data reveals that workers have very little time 
to acknowledge the content of their contracts, which is 
sometimes written in a language they do not speak or 
read. Moreover, many workers do not clearly understand 
the legal tenor of the document that they are requested 
to sign. While completing the survey, one respondent 
mentioned to a member of the research team that he 
believed that the Amigo Laboral staff “mistreated the 
workers” throughout the process. This worker strongly 
believed that workers feared asking questions to staff; 
the respondent had personally witnessed colleagues who 
had been “kicked out of the program” after complaining 
to Amigo Laboral staff about the process.33 Similar dis-
content was expressed by an interviewed worker who 
resented the fact that workers paid money to the recruit-
ment intermediary but were “not being well treated” by 
its agents.34
C. How Much? The Cost of a Canadian Journey
In Canada, the federal immigration normative framework 
is shaped by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
(IRPA)35 and its regulations (IRPR).36 One of the objectives 
of the IRPA is “[...] to facilitate the entry of [...] temporary 
workers for purposes such as trade, commerce, tourism, 
international understanding and cultural, educational and 
scientific activities.”37
The IRPA provides that the “alien” must request and 
obtain visas and other required documents from the 
Canadian Visa Office; the “visa or document may be issued 
if, following an examination, the officer is satisfied that 
the foreign national is not inadmissible and meets the 
requirements of this Act.”38 The visa costs $155.00 CAN. 
31  This could probably explain why some of them (7%) did not know 
what to answer to the question about the language in which the contract was 
written.
32  FG-1, p. 12.
33  Survey #NS47
34  FG-3, p. 12.
35  Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, RSC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]
36  Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 
[IRPR]
37  IRPA, supra note 37, art 3(1)g).
38  Ibid, art 11 (1). 
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In addition to the visa, workers seeking employment in 
Quebec must obtain a Quebec Acceptance Certificate, 
which costs $191.00 CAN.39
Guatemalan workers must also undergo a medical exam-
ination.40 The cost of this examination is paid by the work-
er. The medical examination fee is not set by the Canadian 
government and is therefore likely to vary. 
All of the workers that we met interacted with Amigo 
Laboral. While some were originally hired by the IOM pri-
or to 2010, they were subsequently transferred to Amigo 
Laboral. Those interviewed stated that in 2015, they paid 
an average of 3500Q (+/- $600.00 CAN) to the interme-
diary for the required paperwork (“papeleria”). Workers 
who had returned to Guatemala for less than 6 months 
between contracts were not required to redo a medical 
exam and were required to pay an average amount of 
2600Q (+/- $450,00 CAN).41 
This information was confirmed by the survey data. Ac-
cording to most respondents (91%), this price included the 
visa and medical exams. Though some respondents could 
not identify the exact amounts allocated for different 
expenses, our semi-directed interviews revealed that some 
workers knew that the total amount they paid included 
health insurance, which costs between 280Q and 300Q 
(+/- $50.00 CAN);42 this health insurance plan was put 
forward by Amigo Laboral as of 2010. While workers were 
told that the purpose of this insurance was to protect 
their families43 while they were away, many workers told 
us that the insurance was, in fact, useless.44 According to 
some respondents, the insurance is pointless in several ar-
eas of Guatemala where there are no service providers.45 
For others, the insurance was not useful because you still 
had to “dar una cuota46 (pay a fee)” when going for a med-
ical consultation. The survey revealed that most workers 
believed they could not decline this insurance (70%);47 59% 
39  Regulation respecting the selection of foreign nationals, RLRQ, c 
I-0.2, r 4, art 3 [RSRE].
40 IRPR, supra note 38, art 30 (1) c. Workers will be dispensed of the 
formality if their return to Guatemala between their professional sojourns to 
Canada of for less than 6 months
41  FG-3, p. 5. The workers estimate that the medical examinations costs 
+/- 800 to 850Q (+/- 140,00$ CAN to 150,00$ CAN).
42  FG-1, p. 7 et I-2, p. 7.
43  FG-1, p. 7.
44  FG-1, p. 7 et FG-3, p. 7 et I-2, p. 7. 
45  FG-1, p. 8.
46  I-4, p. 4.
47  2% did not know and 16% did not answer the question.
of respondents did not seem to know why they couldn’t 
decline the insurance plan and 11% thought the insurance 
was mandatory. 
36% of respondents stated that they had paid “cargos 
administrativos” (“administrative fees”) to Amigo Laboral 
to compensate for their work. In addition to such “admin-
istrative fees,” 9% of respondents answered that they also 
had to pay a fee to a “middle person.”48 The “middle per-
son” is not an official agent of the recruitment intermedi-
ary. According to our data, the middle person is often an 
individual who has ties to staff of Amigo Laboral (a friend 
or an ex-colleague for instance), who promises a TFW 
that “he will get him hired.” Other workers witnessed sit-
uations in which workers paid fees to a “middle person” 
who seemed to be tied to employers in Canada. 
Some workers seem to believe that the intervention of 
a middle person is inescapable, perhaps even mandatory. 
Here is how one of our respondents presented the situa-
tion: 
In the office [of Amigo Laboral], indeed, they 
say, workers should not have to pay money 
[to a middle person]. But one is forced to 
pay [a middle person], because if you go to 
the office [of Amigo Laboral in Guatemala 
City] looking for information, they won’t 
give it to you. You must go as recommended 
by “x” persons from different [Guatemalan] 
departments who have contacts with [Amigo 
Laboral] office workers.49
Thus, such a “recommendation” comes with a cost. One 
TFW told the research team that the first time he came 
to Canada, he had paid 10,000Q (+/- $1750.00 CAN) to 
a “middle person” albeit without any assurance that he 
would effectively obtain employment.50 This respondent 
also paid a hefty amount a second time because he was 
not rehired by his first employer. Here is how he synthe-
sized his experience: 
In 2010, I had to pay the amount of 
10,000Q. In 2011 the greenhouse fired me; 
we learned that the employer changed its 
staff for Hondurans. Since I was not rehired, 
48  It has to be noted that 16% of the respondents refused to answer 
this question. This can be explained by the fact that many of these respondents 
commented that they were not comfortable with this question.
49  I-3, p. 2.
50  I-3, p. 3.
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I waited. Suddenly I got a call from the same 
middle person who charged me in 2010. He 
asked for 15,000Q. To give my family well-
being, I had to dig [up] that money to pay, 
and come here [to work]. Since the same 
company rehired me since then, I no longer 
had to spend such money.51 
Several other workers reported similar experiences. One 
told the research team that many workers had to pay 
around 15,000Q (+/- $2600.00 CAN) to a middle person 
to “secure a place in the program,” but with no guarantee 
of obtaining employment.52 A worker also reported that 
some of his colleagues had made “confidential payments” 
up to 15,000Q to “middle persons” and that the sum 
was supposedly shared between the middle person and 
Amigo Laboral’s staff.53 The research team was also told 
that some workers have, in the past, paid agents of Amigo 
Laboral who, in return, promised to secure them “a place 
in the program.”54 
It is also important to note that all of the workers inter-
viewed told us that the cost of traveling to the capital 
was hefty. To complete required administrative formali-
ties, some workers had to travel to the capital up to nine 
times.55 In addition to the transportation costs, which vary 
substantially according to where a worker resides, the 
workers had to pay for accommodation and food. Thus 
to complete the application process, most workers had 
to disburse from 1000Q to 2000Q (+/- $175.00 CAN to 
$350.00 CAN),56 and some had to spend up to 7500Q to 
8500Q (+/- $1300.00 CAN to $1500.00 CAN).57 
Considering that the average monthly wage in Guatema-
la was 2112Q (+/- $380.00 CAN) in 2015,58 how could 
workers afford these expenses? We found that many 
workers had to take out a loan, which often came with in-
terest, to pay for these fees. To be able to pay the recruit-
ment and procedure fees, 56% of respondents stated that 
they had to contract a loan, either with a friend (20%), a 
51  I-3, p. 4
52  Survey #NS51.
53  Survey #NS61.
54  Survey #NS47.
55  I-2, p. 2.
56  FG-3, p. 7.
57  FG-3, p. 7 et I-4, p. 5.
58  Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas Guatemala, Tema/Indicadores, 
2015, online: https://www.ine.gob.gt/index.php/estadisticas/tema-indicadores 
(consulted on 17 November 2016).
family member (15%) or a financial institution (11%).59 32% 
of the workers who borrowed money paid interest to their 
lender. 18% stated that they had to provide their property 
titles as a loan guarantee. It is important to note that 45% 
of the respondents did not answer the question pertaining 
to interest and consequently, did not identify their bor-
rower. As discussed earlier, we believe that fear prevented 
some respondents from answering this question.
***
The results of our research confirm that the recruitment 
process can be a rough ride for workers. In addition to 
the fees that the TFWP requires TFWs to pay,60 Gua-
temalan workers are required to pay an undefined “ad-
ministrative fee” to the recruitment intermediary; some 
also have to pay a “middle person.” Most workers are 
also required to pay for “useless” health insurance. Some 
workers needed loans to pay for these fees, which often 
came with interest. We strongly believe that this last find-
ing may explain why TFWs are generally not inclined to 
act on their labour rights. Research has shown that TFWs 
often self-police and adjust their behaviour to ensure the 
continuation of their employment.61 We previously found 
that TFWs wish to comply with the expectations, real or 
perceived, of different actors, such as their employer or 
the recruitment intermediary; TFWs have strongly interi-
orized that they must “behave” if they wish to keep their 
job.62 If TFWs are indebted, it is very unlikely that they 
will voice concerns about their working conditions or do 
anything that might, in their perception, jeopardize their 
employment.
The fact that the recruitment of TFWs is transnational 
poses an eminent challenge to its regulation. It is there-
fore necessary to examine the normative framework that 
regulates the recruitment of TFWs.
59  Among the unionized workers, the number of respondents who had 
contracted a loan with a financial institution was more significant (27%).
60  These fees pertain to the visa and the medical examination.
61  See Janet McLaughlin et Jenna Hennebry, “Pathways to Precarity: 
Structural Vulnerabilities and Lived Consequences for Migrant Farmworkers in 
Canada” in Luin Goldring et Patricia Landolt, Producing and Negociating Non-Citi-
zenship: Precarious Legal Status in Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 
2013, 175; Tanya Basok, Danièle Bélanger et Eloy Rivas, “Reproducing De-
portability: Migrant Agricultural Workers in South-Western Ontario” (2014) 40:9 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1394.
62  Dalia Gesualdi-Fecteau, “Le droit comme rempart utile? L’usage par 
les travailleurs étrangers temporaires des ressources proposées par le droit du 
travail” (2015) 45:2 Revue générale de droit 531.
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IV. The Regulation of the Recruitment of 
Temporary Foreign Workers: A Normative 
Conundrum? 
As mentioned earlier, in Canada, the federal immigration 
normative framework is shaped by the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and its regulations. One of 
the objectives of the IRPA is “[...] to facilitate the entry of 
[...] temporary workers for purposes such as trade, com-
merce, tourism, international understanding and cultural, 
educational and scientific activities.”63 However, in Cana-
da, labour relations are provincial jurisdictions and each 
Canadian province has its own labour legal framework. 
Hence, some provinces explicitly address the activities 
of recruitment intermediaries. The regulation of the 
recruitment intermediaries can also be governed by the 
normative and administrative frameworks of the various 
countries in which they operate. When such a framework 
exists, issues of compliance may arise. 
The brief overview that follows underpins how the re-
cruitment of TFWs is at the center of a normative conun-
drum. In this section, we will shed light on the normative 
framework applicable to the recruitment of TFWs. After 
presenting the Canadian legal framework (A), we will 
examine how the Guatemalan Labor Code specifically 
charges the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare with the 
protection of the rights of Guatemalan workers abroad 
(B). We will conclude this section with an overview of the 
different international legal instruments aimed at protect-
ing TFWs and will address the reasons why the promotion 
of international treaties should also be contemplated (C).
A. Exploring the nature and scope of the Canadian 
legal framework: a fragmented landscape
If the IRPA works to facilitate the entry of temporary 
workers, it does not specifically address recruitment 
issues. Notwithstanding, the website of ESDC offers tem-
plates of employment contracts that employers should 
use when hiring seasonal agricultural workers through 
the TFWP.64 In these contracts, there are clauses stating 
that the employer “shall not recoup from the employee, 
through payroll deductions or any other means, any costs 
incurred from recruiting the employee.”65 In addition to 
this clause, the contract regarding the Agricultural Stream 
states that this “includes but is not limited to, any amount 
63  IRPA, supra note 37, art 3(1)g).
64  Agricultural Stream Employment contract, supra note 30.
65  Ibid, art 4(3).
payable to a third-party representative/recruiter.”66
In Canada, because labour issues are a provincial jurisdic-
tion, each province has its own specific labour legislation. 
Thus, in many provinces, recruitment issues are addressed 
by labour law, which can regulate the activities of busi-
nesses (employment agencies or employment bureaus) 
that carryout recruitment activities and provide workers 
for client companies.67
Quebec’s legislation provides the least regulation. Apart 
from the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, which 
states that employment bureaus cannot exercise discrim-
ination, Quebec’s labour legislation does not oversee the 
activities of the staffing industry.68
Manitoba’s legislation is more complete and specific. Sec-
tion 2(1) of the Worker Recruitment and Protection Act 
(WRPA) states that any person engaging an “employment 
agency business” in the province must be in possession 
of a licence, unless they fall under an exemption.69 The 
Manitoba regulation also states that all foreign worker 
recruiters must have a licence. If they were to hire with-
out a licence, recruiters could be subject to substantial 
fines ranging from $25,000, in the case of an individual, to 
$50,000, in the case of a corporation.70 Recruiters must 
also provide a substantial amount of information when 
registering, such as the name, address and business num-
ber of their clients, the name and address of every worker 
hired on behalf of their clients, and information about 
the position filled by the worker, etc.71 The WRPA clearly 
states that “an individual who is engaged in foreign worker 
recruitment must not directly or indirectly charge or col-
lect a fee from a foreign worker for finding or attempting 
to find employment for him or her.”72 Moreover, section 
11 of the WRPA regulates the registration of employers 
wishing to hire TFWs: “no employer shall recruit a foreign 
worker without first registering with the Director of 
66  Ibid.
67  Delphine Nakache & Paula J. Kinoshita, “The Canadian Temporary 
Foreign Worker Program: Do Short-Term Economic Needs Prevail over Human 
Rights Concerns?” (2010) 5 Institute for Research on Public Policy Study at p 13
68  Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, RLRQ c C-12, art 18.
69  The Worker Recruitment and Protection Act, CCSM c W197 [WRPA], 
art 2 (1). The term employment agency in Manitoba “means the activities of 
finding individuals — other than child performers or foreign workers — for 
employment, or finding employment for such individuals.”
70  The Worker Recruitment and Protection Act, S.M. 2008, c C-23, art. 
28(2). See also Government of Manitoba. Foreign Recruitment Licence Informa-
tion, see online: http://www.gov.mb.ca/labour/standards/doc,wrpa-license_in-
fo,factsheet.html#q992 (consulted on 22 November 2016). 
71  WRAP, art 11 (3).
72  Ibid, art 15 (4).
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Employment Standards.”73 
In Alberta, the recruitment of TFWs is administered 
through regulations defined in the Employment Agency 
Business Licensing Regulation74 (EABLR). Section 12(1) of 
the EABLR states that employers are not permitted to 
require recruitment fees from the workers or to deduct 
such fees from their salary. Employment agencies must be 
licensed by the government of Alberta, just as in Mani-
toba.75 The Alberta government provides helpful online 
documentation to workers suffering from abuse, where 
the workers’ rights are explained in plain language.76 Some 
of this documentation is translated in seven different 
languages;77 the document Temporary Foreign Workers: a 
Guide for Employees is translated in its entirety in several 
languages.78 The Guide clearly states that “[f]ees cannot be 
charged to potential or recruited workers to find a job.”79
British Columbia’s legislation regarding employment agen-
cies requires that these agencies be licensed.80 Further-
more, section 11 of the provincial Employment Standards 
Act prohibits charging fees to employees to help them 
“find a job or to provide information about prospective 
jobs.” A TFW should not be required to pay for immigra-
tion assistance as a condition of being placed in a job and 
should not be required to post a bond or pay a deposit 
to ensure they will finish a work term or employment 
contract, or to pay a penalty if they do not.
In Nova Scotia, the Labour Standards Code81 was amend-
ed in 2011 to include stipulations concerning licensing of 
73  Ibid, art 11 (1).
74  Employment Agency Business Licensing Regulation, Alta Reg 
189/1999. [EABLR].
75  Ibid, art 2.
76  Government of Alberta, Information for Workers, 2014, see online: 
Alberta, Jobs, Skills, Training and Labour http://work.alberta.ca/Immigration/
workers.html (consulted on 22 November 2016).
77  Documentation is partially translated in English, Chinese, German, 
Hindi, Punjabi, Spanish and Tagalog
78  Temporary Foreign Workers: A Guide for Employees is fully translated 
in English, Chinese, French, German, Hindi, Korean, Polish, Punjabi, Romanian, 
Spanish, Tagalog, Thai, Ukrainian and Vietnamese. 
79  Alberta Jobs, Skills, Training and Labour, Temporary Foreign Workers: 
A Guide for Employees, 2010, see online: http://work.alberta.ca/documents/
WIA-IM-tfw-employee.pdf (consulted on 22 November 2016).
80  Employment Standards Act, RSBC 1996 c 113, art 12(1). The term 
“employment agency” in British Columbia means “a person who, for a fee [that 
employers shall pay], recruits or offers to recruit employees for employers.” Min-
istry of Job, Tourism and Skills Training and Responsible for Labour, Employment 
agencies, see online: http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/employment-business/
employment-standards-advice/employment-standards/licensing/licensing-em-
ployment-agencies (consulted on 22 November 2016).
81  Labour Standards Code, RSNS 1989, c 246.
recruiters and registration of employers of foreign work-
ers. Article 89H(1) provides that “No person shall engage 
in foreign worker recruitment unless the person is an in-
dividual who holds a licence under this Act that authoriz-
es the person to do so.”82 Moreover, the employer has to 
be registered to recruit or engage the services of another 
person to recruit foreign workers for employment.83 
In Saskatchewan, the Foreign Worker Recruitment and 
Immigration Services Act (2013)84 also requires recruiters 
to be licensed85 and the employers of foreign nationals 
to hold a certificate of registration from the Minister of 
the Economy.86 The Act also prohibits practices such as 
“tak[ing] possession of or retain[ing] a foreign nation-
al’s passport or other official document or property,”87 
“threaten[ing] deportation or other action for which 
there is no lawful cause”88 or “tak[ing] action against or 
threaten[ing] to take action against a person for partic-
ipating in an investigation or proceeding by any govern-
ment or law enforcement agency or for making a com-
plaint to any government or law enforcement agency.”89 
Moreover, the Act provides that “no person shall, directly 
or indirectly, charge any person other than an employer 
a fee or expense for recruitment services.”90 Thus, the 
employers are prohibited from requiring a direct payment 
for or reducing the wages of a foreign worker to recover 
the cost of recruitment.91 Finally, the Act provides that all 
contracts for recruitment services must be in writing and 
written in a clear language. The recruiters must also “take 
reasonable measures to ensure that foreign nationals 
whose first language is not the language of the contract 
understand the terms and conditions of the contract 
before they enter into the contract.”92
Finally, Ontario has the most recent legislation with 
regards to the business of TFW staffing. In 2009, a new 
chapter was inserted in the Employment Standards 
82  Ibid, art. 89H(1).
83  Ibid, art. 89T. 
84  The Foreign worker recruitment and immigration services Act, SS 
2013, c F-18.1.
85  Ibid, art. 4.
86  Ibid, art. 14. 
87  Ibid, art. 22(b).
88  Ibid, art. 22(d).
89  Ibid, art. 22(f).
90  Ibid, art. 23.
91  Ibid, art. 23 (4).
92  Ibid, art. 27.
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Act (2000).93 Several prohibitions are listed: the agency 
cannot prevent the hiring of an employee by a client, or 
charge fees to the employee for an assignment or for 
help provided to the employee or others.94 If the agency 
violates these dispositions, the employee can get directly 
refunded.95 Ontario also enacted the Employment Pro-
tection for Foreign Nationals Act (Live-in Caregivers and 
Others) in 2009. That legislation initially only regulated 
the recruitment of foreign nationals employed or seeking 
employment as live-in caregivers in Ontario. However, ef-
fective November 20, 2015, it was amended and renamed 
the Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act, 
2009 (EPFNA). The change in the legislation expanded the 
application to all foreign nationals who, pursuant to an 
immigration or foreign temporary employee program, are 
employed or seek employment in Ontario.96 The EPFNA 
prohibits recruiters from charging any fees to foreign 
nationals,97 either directly or indirectly; generally prevents 
employers from recovering or attempting to recover 
from the foreign national any cost incurred in arranging 
to become the foreign national’s employer;98 prohibits 
employers and recruiters from taking a foreign national’s 
property, including documents such as a passport or work 
permit;99 prohibits a recruiter, an employer, or a person 
acting on their behalf from intimidating or penalizing a 
foreign national for asking about or asserting their rights 
under the EPFNA;100and requires recruiters and, in some 
situations, employers, to distribute information sheets to 
foreign nationals setting out their rights under the EPF-
NA and the Ontario Employment Standards Act.101 That 
said, the application of this legislation is complaint-driven, 
which can be a deterrent for TFWs.102
Despite provincial legislation aimed at regulation of TFW 
recruitment intermediaries in some provinces, an import-
ant question remains: how can Canadian laws extend to 
activities occurring in another country’s jurisdiction? Since 
93  Employment Standards Act, LO 2000, c. 41.
94  Ibid, art 74.8(1).
95  Ibid, art 74.14(1).
96  Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act, 2009, S.O. 2009, c. 
32 (EPFNA).
97  According to section 7 of EPFNA, recruiters are prohibited from 
“charging the foreign national...a fee for any service, good or benefit provided to 
the foreign national,” which is deduced to include both recruitment and immi-
gration assistance.
98  Ibid, art 8. 
99  Ibid, art 9.
100  Ibid, art 10.
101  Ibid, art 11-12.
102  Fay Faraday, “Canada’s choice: Decent work or entrenched exploita-
tion for Canada’s migrant workers?” (2016) Metcalf Foundation at p. 45.
the recruitment process of Guatemalan workers takes 
place in Guatemala, it seems doubtful that the Canadian 
legal framework can regulate the activities of recruiters 
operating in Guatemala. A further question then is wheth-
er Guatemalan laws adequately regulate the activities of 
recruitment intermediaries. 
B. The Guatemalan regulatory framework: from 
formal standards to a compliance assessment 
In Guatemala, section 34 of the Labor Code provides the 
Guatemalan government with legal authority for regulat-
ing the recruitment of temporary workers and specifi-
cally charges the Ministerio de Trabajo y Prevision Social 
(Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare) with the protection 
of the rights of Guatemalan workers abroad.103 Section 34 
specifically establishes the Ministerio’s power to authorize 
the recruiting and departure of workers for jobs abroad 
– work contracts must have the written permission and 
authorization of the Ministerio – and explicitly prohib-
its the execution of contracts without the Ministerio’s 
authorization.104 The contract must establish that all 
expenses will be covered by the recruiter or the employ-
er, including transportation, housing and border crossing 
expenses.105 Workers should not incur any expenses for 
the placement services offered by the recruiting interme-
diary. Additionally, section 34 requires the recruiter or the 
employer to maintain a permanent office in Guatemala 
City for the duration of the contract106 and post a bond 
to guarantee there will be money available for any repa-
triation costs or payment of claims if abuses or breaches 
of contract occur.107 The Guatemalan Labour Code also 
considers “middle agents” and recruiters to be employer 
representatives and the employer is jointly responsible 
for their actions under the Guatemalan Constitution, the 
Code and its regulations.108 
Despite the explicit and strong protections of section 34, 
Guatemala does not have a specific regulation covering 
TFWPs that send Guatemalans abroad; without such 
regulation, there is, simply put, no government capacity to 
ensure that section 34 is implemented and enforced. Since 
103  Labor Code, Decree No. 1441, July 2011 [Labour Code]. Available 
online: http://www.mintrabajo.gob.gt/images/organizacion/leyesconveniosyac-
uerdos/Leyes_Ordinarias/Codigodetrabajodeguatemala2011.pdf.
104  Ibid, art 34 paragraph (d).
105  Ibid, art 34 paragraph (b).  
106  Ibid, art 34 paragraph (a).
107  Ibid, art 34 paragraph (c).
108  Ibid, art 5 and 6
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2014, Guatemala has been on the verge of issuing regu-
lations for intermediaries who recruit temporary foreign 
workers.109 Various stakeholders, including recruitment 
intermediaries, government actors and civil society, have 
all contributed comments to these proposed regulations. 
However, as of the publication of this article, there are still 
no recruitment regulations in place.  
That being said, “national sovereignty is not absolute, and 
the current context of globalization supports the man-
agement of migration policies at the global level.”110 If the 
importance of domestic policy reform should be stressed, 
the promotion of international treaties should also be 
contemplated. 
C. The added value of international regulation: 
recruitment issues as foreseen by international law
Considering the singular situation of TFWs, several inter-
national conventions and recommendations have been 
developed to protect their rights under the aegis of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United 
Nations. Recruitment issues figure in the ILO’s Migration 
for Employment Convention (MEC)111 and the Private 
Employment Agencies Convention (PEAC).112 This issue 
is also taken up in the UN International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (ICRMW).113Although the 
Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention 
(MWC)114 does not address recruitment issues specifical-
ly, it is useful to refer to it, as it is a key instrument with 
respect to migrant worker issues. Though several “sending 
States” have ratified these instruments, the vast majority 
of “receiving States,” including Canada, have yet to ratify 
these conventions. 
The MEC and the ICRMW both stipulate that the right 
109  Global Workers Justice Alliance, Recruitment Rules: Countries of 
Origin (2015). 
110  Ryszard Cholewinski, Paul De Guchteneire & Antoine Pécoud, ed, Mi-
gration and Human Rights: The United Nations Convention on Migrant Workers’ 
Rights, New York: UNESCO Publishing, 2009 at p 214.
111  C097 - Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 
97), 1 July 1949, ILO, Normlex (entered into force in 1952) [MEC].
112  C181 – Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), 19 
June 1997, ILO, Normlex (entered into force : 10 May 2000) [PEAC].
113  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Mi-
grant Workers and Members of Their Families, 18 December 1990, 2220 UNTS 3, 
(entered into force 1 July 2003) [ICPRMW].
114  C143 – Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 
1975 (No. 143), 24 June 1975, ILO Normlex (entered into force 9 December 
1978) [MWC].
to engage in recruitment operations shall be restricted to 
public employment offices or other public bodies of the 
territory in which the operations take place.115 However, 
the recruitment operations may be transferred to private 
entities, if supervised by public authorities.116 The PEAC, 
adopted in 1997, is aimed precisely at regulating the re-
cruitment process undertaken by private agencies “where 
abuse and exploitation of migrants often begins.”117 As in 
the legislation of some provinces in Canada, this Con-
vention states that the private agencies “shall not charge 
directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, any fees or costs 
to workers.”118 It also stipulates that the State “shall de-
termine the conditions governing the operation of private 
employment agencies in accordance with a system of 
licensing or certification, except where they are other-
wise regulated or determined by appropriate national law 
and practice.”119 The Convention also provides that the 
States shall “adopt all necessary and appropriate measures 
[…] to provide adequate protection and prevent abuses 
of migrant workers recruited or placed in its territory 
by private employment agencies. These include laws or 
regulations which provide for penalties, including prohibi-
tion of those private employment agencies which engage 
in fraudulent practices and abuses.”120 
From the 1950s until 1997, the ILO, through Convention 
No.96 Concerning Fee-Charging Employment Agencies, 
“had advocated the prohibition of for-profit, fee-charging 
employment agencies […], a stance that rendered the 
placement of workers a de facto public service monopoly 
in ratifying countries.”121 Thus, with the adoption of the 
PEAC in 1997, the ILO now acknowledges the legality of 
their presence in the international labour market while 
encouraging States to regulate their activities. 
Together with the MEC, the MWC  is the second of two 
conventions that stem from the ILO and directly address 
the issue of migrant workers. While the MEC “aims to 
regulate the entire process of migration from entry to 
return […] [and] establishes the principle of equal treat-
115  MEC, supra note 113 at Annex II, art 3(2); ICRPMW, supra note 115, 
art 66.
116  Ibid at Annex II, art. 3(3); ICRMW, supra note 115, art 66..
117  Ryszard Cholewinski, “Human Rights of Migrants: The Dawn of a new 
era?” (2010) 24 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 585 at p 590. 
118  PEAC, supra note 114 at art. 7(1).
119  Ibid at art. 3(2).
120  Ibid at art. 8(1). 
121  Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore and Kevin Ward, “Constructing markets for 
temporary labour: employment liberalization and the internationalization of the 
staffing industry” (2005) 5:1 Global Networks 4 at p 6. 
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ment with national workers for migrant workers,”122 the 
MWC was conceived “to address the growing problem 
of undocumented or illegal immigration, as well as to 
provide equal treatment of migrant workers.”123 Although 
this Convention does not address the recruitment issue, 
together with the MEC, it constitutes the ILO’s normative 
framework concerning migrant workers. In accordance 
with the MWC, the State shall promote and guarantee 
“equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of em-
ployment and occupation, of social security, of trade union 
and cultural rights and of individual and collective free-
doms for persons who as migrant workers or as mem-
bers of their families are lawfully within its territory.”124
In 1999 the ILO’s Committee of Experts stated in a 
report following its 87th session, that the MEC and the 
MWC “failed to adequately address the changed interna-
tional context of labour migration.” The experts also ob-
served that, “while the 1949 and 1975 instruments were 
originally conceived with a view to covering migration for 
settlement (immediate or gradual), today a rise in migra-
tion for short-term employment can be clearly seen.”125 
Thus, the experts noted that the MEC and the MWC 
were perhaps not appropriate to protect temporary mi-
grant workers, their focus being migration for settlement 
rather than temporary labour migration.
To address this issue, the ILO adopted, in 2005, the Mul-
tilateral Framework on Labour Migration: Non-Binding 
Principles and Guidelines for a Rights-Based Approach to 
Labour Migration.126 It was aimed precisely at address-
ing “the expansion and mounting complexity of labour 
migration.”127 This instrument foresees the workers’ rights 
throughout their migration journey, which often involves 
interacting with a variety of parties.128 The guidelines 
and principles included in this instrument go beyond the 
122  Judy Fudge, “Precarious migrant status and precarious employment: 
the paradox of international rights for migrant workers” (2012) 35 Comparative 
Labour Law and Policy Journal 95 at p 123.
123  Ibid. 
124  MWC, supra note 116 at art. 10.
125  International Labour Office, International Labour Conference: Mi-
grant Workers, 87th session (1999) at para 659. 
126  Ryszard Cholewinski, supra note 119 at p 606. See also: Library of 
Congress, Government of the United States, “Guest workers programs: Interna-
tional Labour Organization” (2015) online: https://www.loc.gov/law/help/guest-
worker/internationallabourorganization.php (consulted on 28 December 2016).
127  International Labour Office, supra note 127 at p V.
128  Leah F. Vosko, “Out of the shadows? The Non-Binding Multilateral 
Framework on migration (2006) and prospects for using international labour 
regulation to forge global labour market membership,” in Guy Davidov and Brian 
Langille. The idea of labour law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011 at p 
378.
principles contained in abovementioned instruments.129 
In fact, it “includes a number of principles and especially 
guidelines addressing previously neglected issues central 
to migrant workers’ protection,”130 such as discrimination 
on the basis of nationality and migration.
Recruitment issues also figure in this non-binding instru-
ment. For instance, principle no. 13 states that “Govern-
ments in both origin and destination countries should give 
due consideration to licensing and supervising recruit-
ment and placement services for migrant workers in 
accordance with the PEAC and its recommendation no. 
188.”131 The principle is followed by guidelines aimed at 
giving it practical effects. Among other things, it suggests 
to “implement legislation and policies containing effective 
enforcement mechanisms and sanctions to deter unethical 
practices, including provisions for the prohibition of pri-
vate employment agencies engaging in unethical practices 
and the suspension or withdrawal of their licences in case 
of violation.”132 Although these principles are non-binding, 
this instrument calls “for global labour market member-
ship, a notion that entails, in part, freeing key labour pro-
tections from the exclusive domain of nation states.”133
Though Canada has not ratified any of the above-men-
tioned conventions or treaties, and thus, is not bound by 
them, they reflect concerns regarding the need for social 
protection of workers as expressed by the highest deci-
sion-making bodies.134 Ratification of these instruments 
would have positive effects on the rights of migrant work-
ers, especially regarding the recruitment process through 
private employment agencies.
Generally, the ratification of international human rights 
treaties can contribute to the “improvement in human 
rights of individuals and groups in the ratifying state.”135 
On one hand, some have argued that ratification of inter-
129  Ibid at p 377.
130  Ibid at p 378.
131  International Labour Organization, ILO Multilateral framework on 
Labour Migration : non binding principles and guidelines for a rights based 
approach to labour migration (2006) at p 24. 
132  Ibid at p 25. 
133  Leah F. Vosko, supra note 130 at p 380.
134 Jean Bernier. L’industrie des agences de travail temporaire: Avis sur 
une proposition d’encadrement, Collection Cahier de transfert – CT-2011-001, 
Québec, Cahiers de l’Alliance de recherche universités-communautés (ARUC), 
2011 at p 29.
135  Natalie Baird, “To ratify or not to ratify? An assessment of the case 
for ratification of international human rights treaties in the Pacific” (2011) 12 
Melbourne of Journal International Law 249 at p 257. See also Beth A. Simmons. 
Mobilizing for human rights: international law in domestic politics, New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
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national treaties can influence the national agenda by “al-
ter[ing] the substantive priorities of the legislative agenda 
compared to what it would have been in the absence of an 
exogenously presented treaty obligation.”136 On the other 
hand, others have suggested that such ratification will gen-
erate more awareness of the particular rights at stake.137
V. Conclusion: Seeking to address the normative 
conundrum: what regulatory pathway?
While the content of ESDC’s employment contract tem-
plate forbids employers to recoup from TFWs any costs 
incurred from recruiting the employee,138 the Canadian 
regulatory framework does not comprehensively and fully 
foresee unlawful conduct that may occur during recruit-
ment. Moreover, what is the true betterment of these 
contracts? If its content is violated, its enforcement will 
require that a civil legal procedure be initiated. Will TFWs, 
considering their precarious migratory and employment 
status, initiate such a process? Without the support of 
third parties entitled to act in place of the workers, it 
seems unlikely that TFWs, whose resources, both linguistic 
and financial, are very limited, would begin such proce-
dures. Hence, these contracts are unlikely to be perceived 
as highly binding.139  
Theoretically, Canadian provincial labour legislation applies 
to TFWs. However, they cannot address abusive recruit-
ment practices that happen abroad. The question be-
comes: how can Canadian labour laws extend to activities 
occurring under a foreign jurisdiction? We believe that 
one of the main obstacles TFWs will face when seeking 
the protection of provincial regulations is the territorial 
limitations of national legislation. 
In September 2016, Canada’s House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Devel-
opment issued a report on the Temporary Foreign Worker 
Program in which the Committee underpins the specific 
areas of concern that should be addressed “to better en-
sure the TFWP functions in an effective manner that is not 
only responsive to labour market needs but that also fully 
respects the fundamental rights of those who use it.”140 
136  Beth A. Simmons, supra note 137 at p 149. 
137  Natalie Baird, supra note 137.
138  See above at a pages 13/19.
139  On this issue, see Judy Fudge et Fiona MacPhail, “The Temporary 
Foreign Worker Program in Canada: Low-Skilled Workers as an Extreme Form of 
Flexible Labor” (2009) 31:1 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 5.
140  House of Commons Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills 
and Social Development, Temporary Foreign Worker Program, 42nd Parliament, 
Among the observations brought forward in the report, 
the Committee specifically notes that witnesses identified 
loopholes in the monitoring and enforcement of measures 
in place to “deter unscrupulous recruitment practices.”141 
The Committee therefore recommends the creation of an 
accreditation system for recruiters, “which requires com-
pliance with the Temporary Foreign Worker Program rules 
and from which employers could exclusively select.”142 If 
the Committee’s recommendations are followed, we be-
lieve that close attention should be given to the normative 
and institutional architecture of the accreditation system.
We believe the activities of recruitment intermediaries 
operating abroad on behalf of Canadian employers should 
be formally regulated by the Canadian immigration legal 
framework. One of the IRPA’s objectives is to permit Can-
ada to pursue “the maximum social, cultural and economic 
benefits of immigration”143 and “promote international 
justice and security by fostering respect for human rights 
and by denying access to Canadian territory to persons 
who are criminals or security risks.”144 The interpretation 
and the implementation of the Act must further “the do-
mestic and international interests of Canada”145 while en-
suring that decisions taken under this Act “are consistent 
with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”146 
and comply “with international human rights instruments 
to which Canada is signatory.”147
Section 135 of the IRPA states that “[a]n act or omis-
sion that would by reason of this Act be punishable as an 
offence if committed in Canada is, if committed outside 
Canada, an offence under this Act and may be tried and 
punished in Canada.”148 There is therefore a definite possi-
bility that activities taking place abroad could be regulated 
by the IRPA. 
The IRPA should therefore be amended to regulate the 
recruitment of TFWs. The specifics of the regulation could 
be foreseen in the IRPR; all “administrative fees” paid to 
recruitment intermediaries or “middle persons” by TFWs 
should be deemed unlawful. TFWs should also have a 
1st session, 2016 at p 27, see online: http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/
Publication.aspx?Language=E&DocId=8374415 (Consulted on November 30th).
141  Ibid at p 26.
142  Ibid at p 34 (recommendation 20).
143  IRPA, supra note 37, art 3 (1) a).
144  Ibid, art 3 (1) i).
145  Ibid, art 3 (3) a).
146  Ibid art 3 (3) d).
147  Ibid art 3 (3) f).
148  Ibid, art 135.
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positive right to withdraw from any additional “services” 
offered by the recruitment intermediary, such as health 
insurance plans. 
Recruitment intermediaries operating abroad should be 
required to register with Canadian embassies. The obliga-
tion for the Canadian Embassy to maintain a register of 
recruitment intermediaries should be added to the IRPR, 
along with the rules entitling recruiters to be accredited. 
The IRPR should also include an obligation for Canadian 
liaison agencies to obtain a licence to operate. Canadi-
an liaison agencies such as FERME should be prohibited 
from contracting abroad with non-accredited recruitment 
intermediaries. If cases of cooperation with unregistered 
foreign recruiters were documented, Canadian liaison 
agencies would be deprived of their licences. Consequent-
ly, employers should have to identify, in their Labour Mar-
ket Impact Assessment, the mandated liaison agency they 
intend to engage. Employers availing of the services of a 
non-registered liaison agency should be subject to hefty 
fines. The list of licenced recruitment intermediaries and 
liaison agencies should be publicly accessible as well as the 
entities charging illegal fees. 
Lastly, the IRPR should clearly state that employers are 
strictly liable for all unlawful fees paid by the workers, not-
withstanding the context. As the recruitment intermediary 
acts on behalf of the employer, the employer should be 
held accountable for the acts of its mandatary. In order for 
this policy avenue to be effective, ESDC’s agents should be 
mandated to conduct onsite audits; ESDC should also have 
the power to make claims on behalf of workers.
Despite the control of the recruitment process that such 
measures would entail, some externalities and adverse 
effects are to be expected. It is the intermediary who is at 
fault, not the TFW, when an unlawful fee is demanded. Due 
to the position of power that the intermediary holds in 
accessing jobs in Canada, the TFWs have no choice but to 
comply with intermediaries’ demands, legal or not, if they 
want a job. When the unlawful practice is detected, the 
intermediary, not the TFW, should be subject to the con-
sequences. The TFW should be granted the visa and be 
reimbursed by the employer. If the TFW is denied the visa, 
the worker is left in a very dire situation; likely in debt, 
and with no job in Canada to pay it off, this puts the TFW 
and their family at serious risk. It also sends a message to 
other TFWs not to admit to paying fees, obscuring the 
ability for authorities to root out these unlawful practices.
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